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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Phillip R. Smalley appeals from his judgment of conviction for sexual abuse of a
vulnerable adult.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Smalley with two counts of sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult
and one count of forcible sexual penetration by a foreign object, all committed against
victim F.B. (R., pp. 133-35, 419-21.) The state moved to present the deposition testimony
of F.B. in lieu of live testimony because F.B.’s physical frailty and other limitations made
her unavailable for trial. (R., pp. 165-67, 255-56, 257-67.) The district court granted the
state’s motions over defense objections. (R., pp. 292-95; see also Aug. pp. 557-67.) Based
on her age, health and status, the district court concluded that F.B. “appears clearly unable
to be present at trial for live testimony,” and allowed the presentation of her deposition
testimony subject to specific objection. (R., pp. 292-95.)
The case proceeded to trial. (R., pp. 424-30, 433-455.) One of the jury instructions
given by the district court was an elements instruction for the crime of sexual abuse of a
vulnerable adult, based on the ICJI, which included the statutory definition of “vulnerable
adult.” (R., p. 472; compare with ICJI 990; I.C. § 18-1505(4)(e) (definition of “vulnerable
adult”).) The jury found Smalley guilty on all three counts. (R., p. 483.)
The district court sentenced Smalley to concurrent sentences of 25 years with 10
years determinate on each of the three convictions. (R., pp. 500-02.) Smalley filed a notice
of appeal timely from the entry of judgment. (R., pp. 504-06.)
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ISSUES
Smalley states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the State offer sufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Smalley’s
convictions for sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult?

2.

Did the district court err in admitting [F.B.]’s deposition in lieu of
live testimony?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Although couched as a sufficiency of the evidence claim, Smalley argues that the
state had to prove mental, as opposed to physical, impairments to prove that F.B. was a
vulnerable adult. He does not argue that, if F.B.’s physical impairments were a proper
ground for finding her to be a vulnerable adult, the evidence was insufficient. Is Smalley’s
argument without merit as a matter of statutory interpretation because F.B.’s physical
impairments showed she was a vulnerable adult?
2.
Smalley objected to admitting F.B.’s deposition testimony on confrontation and
hearsay grounds, contending that she was not unavailable. Has Smalley failed to show
clear error in the district court’s finding that F.B. was unavailable?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Smalley Has Failed To Show That F.B.’s Physical Impairments Did Not Render Her A
Vulnerable Adult
A.

Introduction
F.B. was, at the time of these crimes, 102 years old. (Tr., p. 521, Ls. 16-23; p. 537,

Ls. 1-14.) Although “very mentally alert” (Tr., p. 524, Ls. 1-2), she was in an assisted
living facility because she required “[a] lot of care” (Tr., p. 490, L. 11 – p. 491, L. 7;
p. 521, L. 24 – p. 522, L. 18). She had to be transported wherever she went in the facility—
for example from bed to the bathroom, to the shower, and to and from her recliner—in a
wheelchair by a caregiver. (Tr., p. 458, Ls. 2-6; p. 460, L. 6 – p. 461, L. 9; p. 491, Ls. 514; p. 522, Ls. 19-25.) The caregiver had to lift her into and out of the wheelchair. (Tr.,
p. 458, Ls. 2-6; p. 522, Ls. 19-25.) She was incapable of walking, sitting herself up,
standing, dressing herself, or even rolling over in bed. (Tr., p. 458, Ls. 7-18; p. 461, Ls. 313; p. 461, L. 25 – p. 462, L. 11; p. 523, Ls. 1-12; p. 537, Ls. 19-25.) She was incontinent,
and wore an adult diaper. (Tr., p. 458, Ls. 19-25; p. 491, Ls. 19-21.) Her hands were “very
deformed from arthritis.” (Tr., p. 537, Ls. 12-18.) About the only physical task she could
do for herself was eating the “finely chopped or pureed” food the caregivers gave to her
with “a large handled spoon because she’s not able to hold a small handled spoon.” (Tr.,
p. 491, Ls. 14-18; p. 537, Ls. 17-18.)

F.B.’s frailty and vulnerability are further

demonstrated by her video deposition. (State’s Exhibit 1A.)
The state charged Smalley with two counts of sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult
for engaging in “manual-genital and genital-genital contact” and “manual-genital contact”
with F.B. (R., p. 420.) The jury found him guilty on both counts. (R., p. 483.) For
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purposes of this appeal, Smalley does not challenge the jury’s conclusion he committed the
sexual acts, but argues that the evidence was insufficient to show F.B. was a “vulnerable
adult.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-18.) Smalley argues that physical impairment does not
meet the statutory definition of vulnerable adult despite the inclusion of “‘physical …
impairment’” in the definition. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-14 (quoting I.C. § 18-1505(e)).)
Smalley’s argument fails because “physical … impairment” is a specific statutory ground
for finding that a victim is a vulnerable adult.
B.

Standard Of Review
“The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises

free review.” Simono v. House, 160 Idaho 788, 791, 379 P.3d 1058, 1061 (2016) (internal
quotations omitted).
C.

The Plain Language Of The Statute Provides That A Victim May Be A Vulnerable
Adult Due To Physical Impairment
“Statutory interpretation begins with the statute’s plain language. That language is

to be given its plain, obvious and rational meaning.

If that language is clear and

unambiguous, the Court need merely apply the statute without engaging in any statutory
construction.” State v. Flores, 162 Idaho 298, ___, 396 P.3d 1180, 1183 (2017) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). A person commits sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult by
committing a lewd or lascivious act on a vulnerable adult.

I.C. § 18-1505B(1)(a).

“Vulnerable adult” is defined, for purposes of this crime, in I.C. § 18-1505. I.C. § 181505B(1)(d). The language at issue is thus as follows:
“Vulnerable adult” means a person eighteen (18) years of age or older who
is unable to protect himself from abuse, neglect or exploitation due to
physical or mental impairment which affects the person’s judgment or
4

behavior to the extent that he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to
make or communicate or implement decisions regarding his person, funds,
property or resources.
I.C. § 18-1505(4)(e). Review of this language leads to the inescapable conclusion that
physical impairment that renders an adult unable to protect herself from sexual abuse, as
F.B. most certainly was, renders her a vulnerable adult.
Where the language in a statute is disjunctive, not conjunctive, only one of the
alternatives given must be met. See State v. Idaho Conservation League, 131 Idaho 329,
334, 955 P.2d 1108, 1113 (1998); State v. Maynard, 139 Idaho 117, 120, 73 P.3d 731, 734
(Ct. App. 2003). After the requirements that F.B. be 18 years or older (which the evidence
establishes and is not challenged), the statutory vulnerable adult definition uses several
successive disjunctive clauses:


“unable to protect himself from abuse, neglect or exploitation”



“due to physical or mental impairment”



“which affects the person’s judgment or behavior”



“to the extent that he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity”



“to make or communicate or implement”



“decisions regarding his person, funds, property or resources.”

I.C. § 18-1505(4)(e) (emphasis added). Using only the relevant choices among the
alternatives given reveals the following: “unable to protect [her]self from abuse … due to
physical … impairment which affects the person’s … behavior to the extent that [s]he lacks
sufficient … capacity to … implement decisions regarding [her] person ….” I.C. § 181505(4)(e) (brackets added to show relevant sex). The evidence shows that F.B. easily met
this definition. That she was unable to protect herself from abuse due to her physical
5

impairment is beyond cavil. Moreover, evidence that she could not so much as implement
a decision to take a shower, get into her own wheelchair, sit up, or roll over in bed
demonstrated that her impairment affected her behavior to the extent she lacked sufficient
capacity to implement decisions regarding her person. The evidence that F.B. was a
vulnerable adult was not merely sufficient, it was overwhelming.
Smalley does not contest the overwhelming nature of the evidence of F.B.’s
physical impairment. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-18.) He argues, however, that such is not
relevant because only mental impairment can render a victim a vulnerable adult under the
statute. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-14.) He acknowledges that the statute specifically
includes “‘physical … impairment,’” but argues that “such impairment is only relevant to
the extent it affects a person’s ‘understanding or capacity.’” (Appellant’s brief, p. 13
(quoting I.C. § 18-1505(4)(e)).) This argument fails because Smalley offers no explanation
of how a “physical impairment” cannot affect a person’s “capacity,” especially in the
statutory context of “capacity to … implement decisions regarding [her] person.”
As noted above, a vulnerable adult is an [A] adult who is “[B] unable to protect
himself from abuse, neglect or exploitation [C] due to physical or mental impairment which
[D] affects the person’s judgment or behavior [E] to the extent that he lacks sufficient
understanding or capacity to make or communicate or implement decisions regarding his
person, funds, property or resources.” I.C. § 18-1505(4)(e) (brackets added).) Smalley’s
argument does not challenge elements A through D, only element E. Put another way, he
does not dispute that F.B. is an adult, unable to protect herself from abuse, due to physical
impairment, which affects her behavior.

He only disputes whether F.B.’s physical

impairment affects her behavior “to the extent that [s]he lacks sufficient understanding or
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capacity to make or communicate or implement decisions regarding [her] person, funds,
property or resources.” I.C. § 18-1505(4)(e). His challenge is based on the unwarranted
assumption that “capacity” means “mental capacity” while ignoring the language that says
it is capacity to “implement decisions regarding [her] person.” Smalley’s argument is
based on language that is not present while ignoring language that is present in the statute.
Smalley next argues that his proposed interpretation of the definition of vulnerable
adult is “consistent with” State v. Knutsen, 158 Idaho 199, 345 P.3d 989 (2015).
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-14.) Review of the analysis and holding in that case belies this
argument.
The vulnerable adult victim in Knutsen was a psychiatric hospital patient with a
“full-scale IQ of 72” who “had been admitted to the hospital because she was depressed
and suicidal.” Id. at 200, 345 P.3d at 990. Knutsen argued that I.C. § 18-1505B was
“overbroad because it interferes with his right of association,” specifically his “right to
have consensual sex with an adult.” Id. at 203, 345 P.3d at 993. The Court rejected that
argument, holding, “Idaho Code section 18–1505B does not proscribe any constitutionally
protected conduct. The district court did not err in holding that ‘there is no constitutional
right to have sexual relations with a person who is incapable of providing consent.’” Id. at
205, 345 P.3d at 995. Its holding that Knutsen was not exercising a constitutional right
was based on two premises: the “conduct did not occur in a dwelling or other private place,”
and “was not between two adults with full and mutual consent from each other.” Id. at
204, 345 P.3d at 994. Although the facts of Knutsen were that the victim was a vulnerable
adult due to mental impairment, there is nothing in the Court’s analysis or holding
suggesting that the statutory language regarding physical impairment is a mere nullity as
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argued by Smalley. The holding and analysis of Knutsen are, at best, irrelevant and, at
worst, damning for Smalley who has not and cannot claim that his sexual predation was
consensual.
In this case Smalley never claimed that F.B. consented to a sexual act (nor could he
credibly do so). The state’s theory was not that F.B. lacked the mental capacity to consent
to sex, but that she lacked the physical capacity to protect herself against unwanted sexual
acts. Smalley’s argument that F.B.’s inability to resist his unwanted sexual violations
because of her physical impairments did not render her a vulnerable adult is contrary to
any reasonable reading of the statute.
II.
Smalley Failed To Show Clear Error In The District Court’s Finding That F.B. Was
Unavailable
A.

Introduction
The district court granted the state’s motion to allow introduction of the video

deposition of F.B., specifically finding that she was unavailable because she was “clearly
unable to be present at trial for live testimony” because of her physical condition. (R.,
pp. 292-95.) Smalley claims there was an “insufficient basis” to find F.B. was unavailable
because there was “no evidence suggesting [F.B.] could not physically be transported to
court, or that she would suffer undue harm by going to court to testify.” (Appellant’s brief,
p. 19.) His argument is premised on the false claim that “no doctor opined that testifying
would have been detrimental to [F.B.’s] health.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 26.) Because the
medical evidence established that F.B. was too frail to tolerate either the trip or the court
appearance, and Smalley simply ignores that evidence, he has failed to show error in the
district court’s determination that F.B. was unable to be present at trial for live testimony.
8

B.

Standard Of Review
“The determination of whether a witness is unavailable, such that preliminary

hearing testimony is admissible, is evidentiary in nature. Evidentiary decisions are
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Anderson, ___ Idaho ___, ___
P.3d ___, 2017 WL 2952458, at *7 (Idaho July 11, 2017) (citing Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus
Reg’l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 163–64, 45 P.3d 816, 819–20 (2002)).
C.

Smalley Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
The Confrontation Clause “bars admission of testimonial statements of a witness

who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had
a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” State v. Sepulveda, 161 Idaho 79, 82, 383 P.3d
1249, 1252 (2016) (internal quotation omitted). Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) provides
an exception to the rule that hearsay is inadmissible “where: (1) the witness is unavailable;
and (2) ‘the party against whom the testimony is now offered ... had an opportunity and
similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.’” State
v. Lopez-Orozco, 159 Idaho 375, 381, 360 P.3d 1056, 1062 (2015) (quoting I.R.E.
804(b)(1)). “[A] witness may be deemed unavailable if he or she ‘is unable to be present
or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental illness or
infirmity.’” State v. Perry, 144 Idaho 266, 269, 159 P.3d 903, 906 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting
I.R.E. 804(a)(4)).
“The ultimate question” regarding witness availability “is whether the witness is
unavailable despite good-faith efforts undertaken prior to trial to locate and present that
witness.” Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980) abrogated on other grounds by Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). See
also ---------Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724–25 (1968)
- --9

(“a witness is not ‘unavailable’ for purposes of the foregoing exception to the confrontation
requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his
presence at trial”). The state need not undertake all possible steps to procure the witness;
rather the lengths to which the state must go “is a question of reasonableness.” Hardy v.
Cross, 565 U.S. 65, 70 (2011).
In considering whether a person suffers an infirmity that makes her unavailable, the
“judge must consider symptoms [and] what tasks a witness is then capable of.” Anderson,
2017 WL 2952458 at *7. It is “well established that the infirmity of an elderly witness
which prevents him or her from traveling is an ‘exceptional circumstance’ which justifies
the use of deposition testimony at trial.” United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 1374, 1377–
78 (6th Cir. 1988); -see --also ----------Caldwell v. State, 916 S.W.2d 674, 676 (Tex. App. 1996) (“An
infirmity that prevents an elderly witness from traveling is an exceptional circumstance
that justifies the use of deposition testimony at trial.”). Thus, for example, there was no
error in admitting deposition testimony where the witness was “89 years old, homebound,
in a wheelchair, and receiving home health care.” State v. Christian, 364 S.W.3d 797, 802
(Mo. Ct. App. 2012).
The district court concluded that F.B. “appears clearly unable to be present at trial
for live testimony.” (R., p. 294.) This conclusion is supported by the evidence in the
record. Mary Jean Tranfo, a registered nurse providing hospice care for F.B. (Tr., p. 13,
L. 10 – p. 14, L. 18), testified that F.B. was 103 years of age, had rheumatoid arthritis that
had caused contractures of her hands and feet and pain in all her joints, was incontinent,
was able to feed herself “with difficulty,” and had difficulty swallowing (Tr., p. 15, Ls. 1621). It was very difficult for F.B. to move around; she was unable to turn herself in bed
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and she could not stand on her own. (Tr., p. 16, Ls. 12-16.) Other than feeding herself,
she required assistance in “all other activities of daily living.” (Tr., p. 16, Ls. 17-18.) In
the prior year she had not been transported from the facility except once—for a medical
examination after being sexually abused by Smalley. (Tr., p. 18, Ls. 6-9; p. 19, L. 9 –
p. 20, L. 2.)
The district court also considered three letters from physicians. Dr. Thomas Martin
wrote that F.B. “meets the definition of ‘vulnerable adult’ primarily due to physical
impairment.” (Exhibits, p. 88.) “She is a frail and very elderly 103yo woman admitted for
hospice care for complications associated with longstanding Rheumatoid Arthritis.” (Id.)
She “requires full assistance with all Activities of Daily Living (ADLs), and has a bed-tochair existence.” (Id.) The “stress of the abuse she recently suffered” compounded her
“global debility.” (Id.) She had “around-the-clock presence of persons to assist her and
provide care.” (Id.)
Dr. Lorene H. Lindley wrote that F.B. was “bed and chair bound” and had “agerelated difficulty with swallowing.” (Exhibits, p. 89.) Dr. Lindley also previously wrote1
that F.B. “cannot tolerate a court appearance since she is 102 years old and confined to
bed, recliner, and wheelchair.” (R., p. 86.) She was “quite weak and under hospice care.”
(Id.) “She also would not be able to tolerate the long drive to Coeur d’Alene.” (Id.2)

1

This letter was referenced by the district court in its memorandum decision as attached to
the previously filed Motion for Taking of Witness Testimony by Video Deposition. (R.,
p. 293.)
2

The facility where F.B. lived was in Spirit Lake. (Tr., p. 354, Ls. 23-24; p. 521, Ls. 2425.)
11

Finally the state also presented the videotape and transcript of F.B.’s deposition.
(Tr., p. 54, L. 17 – p. 56, L. 14.) The video shows how frail F.B. was at that time. (State’s
Exhibit 1A.3)
The evidence supports the district court’s ruling. That F.B. suffered physical
infirmities is beyond dispute. The finding that her infirmities rendered her unavailable
because she was “unable to be present at trial for live testimony” (R., p. 294) was supported
by the facts, the evidence, and the law. The district court did not abuse its discretion.
Smalley contends the district court erred because the evidence shows only that F.B.
would be “merely inconvenienced by coming to court.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 22.) He
argues that the evidence did not show F.B. “was physically incapable of being transported
to the courthouse or that such a trip would have caused dire health consequences for her.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 25.) He further claims that “no doctor opined that testifying would
have been detrimental to her health.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 26.) These arguments are not
well taken.
The district court properly concluded that presenting F.B.’s deposition was far more
than a matter of her inconvenience. The district court concluded F.B. “appears clearly
unable to be present at trial for live testimony.” (R., p. 294.4) The district court’s

3

The exhibit in the appellate record was admitted at the trial, and is the redacted version.
The complete version presented to the district court pre-trial does not appear to be in the
record.
4

Smalley claims the district court “essentially” ruled that F.B. was unavailable “because
her attendance at trial would have been burdensome.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 26.) This is
true only to the extent that the district court’s expressed finding F.B. was “unable to be
present at trial for live testimony” is “essentially” synonymous with “burdensome.”
12

determination that F.B. was unable to be present to present testimony was not a
misapplication of the law or the court’s discretion.
Smalley’s arguments that there was neither evidence nor any medical opinion that
F.B. was physically incapable of being transported and testifying without harm to her
health simply ignores the record. His argument depends on a wheelchair accessible van
being indistinguishable from an ambulance and a courthouse being just like a hospital.
(See Appellant’s brief, p. 25 (evidence that F.B. was transported to the hospital by
ambulance makes it “readily apparent” that all F.B. needed to appear and testify were “a
wheelchair and specialized transport,” “a more comfortable and supporting chair” on the
witness stand, “her adult diapers, and some sort of accommodation for her hearing loss”).)
Moreover, Dr. Lindley’s letter that F.B. could not “tolerate” a court appearance or even the
trip to Coeur d’Alene (R., p. 86) directly refutes Smalley’s claim that F.B. could have
appeared and testified with a few “special accommodations” and that “no doctor opined
that testifying would have been detrimental to her health” (Appellant’s brief, p. 26).
As noted above, the “judge must consider symptoms [and] what tasks a witness is
then capable of.” Anderson, 2017 WL 2952458 at *7. The district court considered F.B.’s
physical infirmities and determined she was “unable to be present at trial for live
testimony.” (R., pp. 293-94.) Because the record and the law support the district court’s
exercise of discretion, Smalley has failed to show an abuse of discretion.
D.

Even If Error, The Error Was Necessarily Harmless
Idaho Criminal Rule 52 provides that “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance

that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.” I.C.R. 52. The proper inquiry
is whether “‘the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely attributable to the
13

error.’” State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 12, 304 P.3d 276, 286 (2013) (quoting Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (emphasis omitted)). “An error is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt if the Court can conclude, based upon the evidence and argument
presented during the trial, that the jury would have reached the same result absent the
error.” State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 471, 163 P.3d 1175, 1183 (2007). The
harmless error test is applicable to Confrontation Clause violations and “depends upon a
host of factors, including the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s
case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence
corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent
of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the
prosecution’s case.” State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 146, 176 P.3d 911, 918 (2007).
The district court made its ruling that F.B. was unable to be present and testify about
a month prior to trial. (R., pp. 292 (ruling on unavailability on February 9, 2016), 424 (first
day of trial on March 8, 2016).) If, as Smalley claims, F.B.’s testimony could have been
presented live by recreating in the court the circumstances of her deposition in the facility
where she lived, beyond a reasonable doubt her live testimony would have carried at least
the same weight with the jury. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that Smalley would have
benefited at trial from having a nurse wheel F.B. into the courtroom and lift her into the
special recliner provided because she was too frail to sit in the normal chair; having F.B.
present her testimony in her weak voice; taking breaks to accommodate her inability to
proceed; and finishing with the nurse lifting her out of the recliner, back into her
wheelchair, so she could be removed from the court. (See, e.g., Tr., p. 43, L. 19 – p. 45,
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L. 10 (prosecutor’s description of deposition); State’s Exhibit 1A (edited video of
deposition).)
Likewise, F.B.’s testimony at trial would not have been different in any meaningful
way had she presented it live. The only difference Smalley identified below was that he
did not have all the medical records provided in discovery before the deposition. (Aug.,
pp. 559-60; Tr., p. 50, L. 22 – p. 51, L. 24.) Smalley did not articulate any particular line
or topic of cross examination that was not covered, however. (Aug., pp. 559-60; Tr., p. 50,
L. 22 – p. 51, L. 24.) The state asserted that the relevant medical records had been provided
before the deposition and that the cross-examination about F.B.’s medical condition was
extensive. (Tr., p. 52, L. 15 – p. 53, L. 1.) The record supports this assertion. Crossexamination in the deposition included what medicines F.B. took on the day of the
deposition and the day of the offense (Exhibits, pp. 102-03), her difficulty hearing and
seeing (Exhibits, pp. 104-05), a prior urinary tract infection and treatment and whether she
suffered hallucinations as a result (Exhibits pp. 105-06), and whether she received any
medicine by suppository or ever used a catheter (Exhibits, pp. 107-08). These were the
same medical issues addressed by the defense at trial. (Tr., p. 527, L. 16 – p. 529, L. 19;
p. 539, L. 22 – p. 549, L. 24; State’s Exhibits 1A & 1B.) No additional medical issues
were raised at trial even though the defense had ample opportunity to do so. (See generally
Tr., pp. 348-645.) Because the purpose of the deposition was to preserve trial testimony,
there is no reason to believe that cross-examination would have been any different than
conducted in the deposition.
The record establishes that the testimony presented live would have been
substantively the same as the deposition testimony. That the testimony was presented in a
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different form (video) did not prejudice Smalley. The jury was presented a complete
examination and cross-examination. Because the deposition was presented in a video, the
jury could see F.B.’s demeanor. Presenting her testimony live instead of by the video and
transcript of the deposition did not prejudice Smalley. To the contrary, it likely would have
been more beneficial to the prosecution to expose the jury to exactly how frail F.B. was by
presenting her live to the jury. Because the record establishes beyond a reasonable doubt
that presenting F.B.’s testimony live, as opposed to by the video deposition, would not
have in any way benefited Smalley or been to the state’s detriment, there was no prejudice
and any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of conviction.
DATED this 18th day of September, 2017.

__/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen__________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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